We build and calibrate a model of simultaneous transitions on the housing and the labor market in order to account for the residual unemployment gap between African immigrants and non-immigrants in France. Our framework allows us to distinguish between the impact of ethnic-specific geographical preferences and ethnic-specific barriers to these two markets. The labor market accounts for about 85% of the residual unemployment gap, whereas the housing market accounts for about 75% of the ethnic differences in geographical location. Geographical preferences do not substantially impact the unemployment gap and account for about 25% of differences in residential location.
Introduction
This paper aims to document the links between the unemployment rate and the geographical location of people of African origin in France. All other observable characteristics being equal, African immigrants (henceforth called "Africans") are over-exposed to unemployment risk (Aeberhardt, Fougère, Pouget, and Rathelot (2010) ), they are over-represented in large cities, and they less often move to smaller towns (Bouvard, Combes, Decreuse, Laouénan, Schmutz, and Trannoy (2009) ). There are three possible, potentially complementary explanations for this triple finding: first, Africans may have trouble entering the labor market in small towns; second, they have trouble entering the housing market in small towns; finally, they do not feel like moving into a small town. To find a method that would allow us to quantify the respective role played by these three factors is difficult because of the simultaneity issue that arises when studying the interactions between residential mobility and labor-market mobility: indeed, the process of moving out generally stems from the combination of getting a new house, finding a new job and being willing to move away.
We calibrate a structural model of job search that combines geographic preferences, job opportunities and access to the housing market. Our model assumes that job seekers look for job opportunities in several local labor markets at the same time, including locations that would be too far away for a commute and would hence require moving out (Burda and Profit (1996) ; see also Antoun (2009) ). The probability of receiving a job offer in a given location depends on the local characteristics of the local labor market. It is lower for an individual who does not live in the corresponding location. We assume that the intensity of job search is lower when it is not conducted within the zone where people live. The employment probability then depends upon several factors, such as the respective probabilities of receiving a job offer in either location as well as, if the offer comes from elsewhere, on the individual's ability to enter the other housing market and her willingness to go and settle in this new location.
The model has two periods, two ethnic groups, Africans and individuals who were French at birth (henceforth called "non-immigrants"), two states, employment and unemployment, and two locations defined by city size, with a 100,000 inhabitant cut-off. It predicts transitions on the labor market and across locations for both ethnic groups. These transitions are then confronted with the transitions that are observed in the Census and the French Housing Survey (Enquête Nationale Logement, Henceforth "ENL"). To this end, we use a group of Africans whose observable characteristics are distributed similarly to those of non-immigrants. This method allows us to recover the structural parameters of the model: the probability of receiving a job offer and the probabilities of getting a housing offer, conditional on having received, or not, a job offer at the same time. They depend on the ethnic group, the initial employment status, and the residential location at each period. We also calibrate the ethnic-specific distributions of geographic preferences using the households' declared level of satisfaction vis-à-vis their housing conditions.
Our results are twofold. The first line of results documents the most significant differences between Africans and non-immigrants. Non-immigrants exhibit a strong relative preference for small towns. Given location-specific expected income for each group, we find that 47 % of Africans will choose to be unemployed (while not homeless) in a large city rather than to be employed in a small town, whereas this number goes down to 40 % for non-immigrants. In both locations, the probability for Africans to stay employed over both periods is lower by over 10 points. On the contrary, the probability of leaving unemployment is similar across ethnic groups. Africans seem to have issues regarding the steadiness of their employment relationships. Finally, the probability of receiving a housing offer while having received a job offer at the same time is much lower for Africans.
The second line of results consists in the quantitative assessment of the impact of the interplay between residential and labor-market mobility on the residual unemployment gap and the location differences between the two groups. First, we show that the residual unemployment gap is mostly driven by the difficulties experienced by Africans on the labor market, and, in particular, the instability of their employment relationships. The housing market only accounts for 10 % of the gap, geographical preferences account for 2 % and hysteresis effects stemming from the initial spatial distribution of the two groups, for another 2 %. Space as a whole can then be said to account for 15 % of the gap. This figure may strike us as surprisingly low, but one has to keep in mind that this is a residual unemployment gap, taking into account differences in individual observable characteristics. Second, the differences in the location of the two ethnic groups are mostly driven by ethnic-specific geographical preferences and the functioning of the housing market, rather than by the labor market. The differences in access to the housing market accounts for more than 70 % of the long-run location differential between the two groups, whereas geographical preferences account for 20 % of this differential. 1 The contribution of the present work stems from the presentation of new stylized facts as well as a new method for quantifying the respective roles of geographical preferences and frictions on both the housing and the labor markets. The low relative performance of ethnic minorities on the labor market is mainly explained by the two following factors: first, they may suffer from different forms of labor market discrimination (see Bouvard, Combes, Decreuse, Laouénan, Schmutz, and Trannoy (2009) and Duguet, Léandri, and Petit (2007) on France) ; second, they may face a situation of spatial mismatch within metropolitan areas (see Gobillon and Selod (2007) and Gobillon, Magnac, and Selod (2011) on France). However, only a few studies deal with the fact that residential location, even at the intra-urban scale, is endogenous to labor market performance. Aslund,Ôsth, and Zenou (2010) offer a good summary of all the caveats associated with the quantification of the impact of residential location on labor market performance and propose a natural experiment on a specific type of immigrant, political refugees, in order to restrict the magnitude of the bias. However, this kind of approach raises another question, related to the level of external validity of the results. Here, we choose to take another path and calibrate a structural model. Our results, which thus depend on the relevance of our model's assumptions, allow us to perform simple decompositions and isolate the role of the housing market. 2 Studies on spatial mismatch only consider the problem of the location of ethnic minorities within metropolitan areas. They do not seek to explain why ethnic minorities are not evenly scattered between regions, or between cities of different sizes, which is typically the case of Africans in France (Bouvard, Combes, Decreuse, Laouénan, Schmutz, and Trannoy (2009) ). When economists study the determinants of the location of immigrants, whether due to individual characteristics, local demographic characteristics (Bartel (1989) ), or the magnetic effect of the local welfare (Borjas (1999) ) or public housing supply (Verdugo (2011) ), they mostly focus on initial location, and neglect the dynamics of interregional mobility, which could alter this first split. On the contrary, some studies have tried to assess the determinants of interregional mobility, in particular in relation to differences in local wages and local unemployment rates; but this time-without considering the specificity of the location process of immigrants (one early example is Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) ). Finally, this type of approach neglects the specific role of the housing market. Recent studies in labor economics have started to model this interaction. For instance, Rupert and Wasmer (2009) suggest an explanation for the unemployment differential between the US and Europe, which is partly based on the higher level of frictions in the European housing market. Our theoretical framework is designed to consider the interactions between both markets. To our knowledge, the role of these interactions, and, more generally, interactions between geographical mobility and labor market mobility on the inter-ethnic differences on the labor market is still an open question, even in the US. One noteworthy exception is Raphael and Riker (1999) , who develop both theoretical and empirical arguments to explain why part of the wage gap at the expense of Afro-Americans and Hispanics stems from their lower geographical mobility. 3 We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the main differences between Africans and nonimmigrants in terms of labor market, residential location and residential mobility. Section 3 presents a model of individual transitions between two locations, big cities and small towns, and two states, employment and unemployment. This model is then calibrated using data from the National Housing Survey in Section 4, which allows us to assess the impact of the different parameters of the model through a counterfactual analysis in Section 5. Section 6 discusses different specifications and presents some robustness checks of our framework and Section 7 concludes.
Stylized facts
This section describes the data from the Enquête Logement, used throughout this paper. Two stylized facts motivate our analysis: first, people of African origin are more exposed to unemployment risk, and this remains true even when observable characteristics are controlled for; second, people of African origin are over-represented in large cities, and less likely to move out to smaller cities. Conversely, they are more likely to move to large cities when they live in small towns.
We consider the following sample of households surveyed by the Enquête Nationale Logement in 1996 Logement in , 2002 Logement in or 2006 , who were already living in metropolitan France four years before the date of the survey and were the official tenants of their accommodation, who were part of the working population at the date of the survey and were already part of it four years before. We consider all the households, whatever the age or gender of the respondent. We focus on the respondent's characteristics in our analysis; we implicitly assume that s/he is the decision-maker as far as the household location is concerned. 4 Throughout this paper, we present summary statistics aggregating data from the three survey rounds, which correspond to the 1996-2006 decade average.
In this sample of 56,733 households, 3,246 (5.7%) are considered as "African", since the respondent is an African immigrant. Similarly, two other groups of immigrants can be isolated from the data as "European" and "Rest of the World" (which refers to the three other continents). As shown in Table 1 , these groups differ from the group of non-immigrants along many observable characteristics: respondents are on average older, less educated and more likely to be men. They also live in larger households with more children. We are interested in the unemployment exposure of these different populations as well as their spatial distribution across the French territory. The unemployment exposure is measured by the unemployment rate of the working population. The spatial distribution relies upon the split proposed by Bouvard, Combes, Decreuse, Laouénan, Schmutz, and Trannoy (2009) . They point that even though the population of African origin is as likely to move out as the rest of the population, its mobility between more or less densely-populated areas is low. Therefore we distinguish between two types of location, depending on the city size, as defined by INSEE.
Location 1 refers to the cities with less than 100,000 residents, as measured in the 1990 and 1999 censuses (city size from 0 to 5), and location 2 refers to the cities with more than 100,000 residents (city size from 6 to 8). This split is convenient because it divides the non-immigrant population into two groups of similar size.
The three groups of immigrants highlighted in Table 1 are noticeably different from the nonimmigrant group along these two dimensions. However we choose to isolate the African group from the rest of the population for two main reasons (see Table 2 ). First, their unemployment rates (20.3% vs. 6.9% for non-immigrants) and their spatial distribution (23.9% live in location 1 vs 55% for non-immigrants) are the least comparable to those of non-immigrant households. Second, if we reweigh the immigrant groups so that the distribution of their observable characteristics described in Table 1 is similar to the non-immigrant distribution, it does not affect the unemployment rates and location types of Africans, whereas it noticeably reduces the gaps for the other two immigrant groups. In the rest of the paper, we neglect the other populations of immigrants and we consider a population of African immigrants, called "weighted Africans", whose observable characteristics are distributed similarly to the characteristics of non-immigrants. These characteristics are: gender, age and qualifications of the respondent, household size and number of children in the household. These variables are divided into two, six, four, six, and four classes, respectively. The weight associated with each African household is the product of its sample weight with the weighted population of non-immigrants who fall into the same categories; as for non-immigrant households, they are only weighted with their own sample weight. It may be interesting to distinguish between North Africans and other Africans, but we do not have enough observations to do so. Note, also, that this reweighting does not rule out the possibility that some of the observed residual differences are driven by unobservable characteristics. Table 3 provides additional information, thanks to a specificity of the Enquête Logement. The ENL is a cross-section survey with a panel dimension, because people are asked questions about their past, in particular about their situation four years before, on a wide range of subjects (family, employment, housing, etc.) . Table 3 displays the transition matrices of the two groups between employment and unemployment, and between location 1 and location 2. The matrices show that Africans have a harder time finding a job, and that their inter-location mobility is much lower than for non-immigrants, especially into location 1. The same conclusions may also be drawn from a regression analysis, as shown in Table 12 3 Theoretical framework
The model
We are interested in the residential and labor-market mobility of two groups of individuals. The model has two periods, during which we observe the geographical location and the employment status of individuals who are defined by five characteristics: their ethnic group i ∈ {A, N A} (i = A if they are Africans), their initial location j ∈ {1, 2} (j = 2 if they lived in a large city in t − 1), their initial employment status f ∈ {u, e} f = u if they were unemployed t − 1), their current location k ∈ {1, 2}, and their current employment status g ∈ {u, e}. We assume that the household head makes mobility decisions, but we take the totality of household income into account. In this framework, an "individual" is equivalent to the household to which s/he belongs. We use a random utility model (Hausman and Wise (1978) ) where a household m receives utility:
with y m household income and d m a location-specific comfort variable. The location choice of a household m of ethnic group i (m) living in location k (m) will then be determined by y i k (g), e.g. real household income averaged by location, ethnic group and employment status, and by the comfort variables d 1 and d 2 , which vary across households. Real income is defined as follows:
The parameter w i k denotes mean real wage, b i k is the mean real non-salary income, including unemployment benefits. To keep things simple, this non-salary income does not depend on past income, but only on location.
The variables d m are randomly distributed in each ethnic group and their distribution may differ across groups. Let d i k be the distribution of geographical preferences of individuals belonging to ethnic group i in location k, i.e. the utility they derive from their mere presence in location k. These preferences are given. They implicitly relate to a set of cultural and family factors, such as the place of birth or the first place of residence in France, the places where individuals spent their holidays during childhood, the region the family is from, etc.
Each individual searches for a job in both locations. The job search intensity is equal to one in the location of residence and it is equal to α ∈ [0, 1] otherwise. The probability of receiving a job offer by search unit depends on location k, ethnic group i, and initial employment status f . This probability is noted p if k . By definition, an individual living in j faces a probability p if j to receive a job offer in j and αp if −j to receive a job offer in the other location. The probability of receiving a housing offer is equal to one for an individual who does not change location between the two periods. We assume that immobile individuals can never lose their housing, regardless of their employment status. This assumption is strong, given that a tenant who loses her job is more likely to default on rent and to face eviction; and the same can happen to homeowners who have not finished paying their mortgage. However, the eviction process is long and costly in France, where tenants, in particular, are protected by the law (Rupert and Wasmer (2009)). Moreover, networks of family members or friends, which are often available close by, protect individuals from the risk of homelessness. As for the housing offer probability in the other location, it depends on ethnic group, location, initial employment status, and on whether the individual has simultaneously received a job offer in this location or not. If so, the housing offer probability in location k is noted s if k ; if not, it is noted x if k . Finally, a type-i individual, initially located in j and with initial employment status f will decide what to do according to her expected utility in the second period, defined by:
where, for instance, the first line describes the situation when the individual receives a job offer in her location but not in the other location (p if j (1 − αp if −j )); in this case, if she still gets a housing offer in the other location (x if −j ), she must compare the utility levels that she derives from being employed in her location or by being unemployed in the other location (max
), whereas no choice has to be made if she does not get a housing offer in the other location
Predicted mobilities
We normalize the size of each ethnic group at one. We consider the members of ethnic group i, initial employment status f and initial location j. Let n if j be the size of this group. Between the two periods, these individuals may change employment status and location. Thus they form four different groups. Let l if jj be the size of the group formed by individuals who were part of the initial group, have remained in location j and are currently employed. Similarly, let l if j−j be the size of the group of those who have left location j and are currently employed in location −j. Finally, let u if j−j be the size of the group of those who have changed location but are currently unemployed in location j. Given that total population is fixed, we do not need to consider the size of the fourth group (individuals who have remained in j and are currently unemployed), which is defined as the residual.
The probability of being employed in the initial location is then defined by:
The probability of moving with a new job in the other location is defined by:
As for the probability of moving without a job, it is defined by:
The left-hand-side term of each of these expressions is given by empirical transition rates. These expressions define four systems (for each pair {i, f }) of six non-linear, independent equations. Their solution (x 
Transition rates
The empirical transition rates that we use correspond to the transitions displayed in Table 3 . Despite its numerous advantages, the ENL survey is here a second best: in France, a long panel dataset with enough observations to isolate a representative group of African immigrants is still missing. The Labor Force Survey cannot be used because individuals are followed over a too short period (18 months at most) to experience interregional mobility. As for the Census, it does not include information on the employment status of the respondent at the time of the previous census. The ENL is a cross-section survey with a retrospective dimension: this raises issues regarding the accuracy of the reporting of previous episodes of unemployment. We come back to this question in Appendix B.
Distribution of geographical preferences
The probabilities are all written as follows:
We consider that the random variable d i 1 − d i 2 follows a normal distribution of parameters µ i 12 and σ i 12 . In order to calibrate the values of µ i 12 and σ i 12 , we use a question in the ENL, which allows us to measure the utility that the household draws from its current housing conditions. We use the categorical variable "Opinion du ménage sur ses conditions actuelles de logement" ("household's opinion regarding its current housing conditions"), which has five classes from "very satisfactory" to "very insufficient". We transform this variable by attributing the grade 10 to the best answer, 8 to the second, etc., down to 2. We only consider here the population of tenants on the private rental market, for reasons of homogeneity: indeed, we lack precise information on housing costs for homeowners; furthermore, it is among private tenants that housing conditions, both between Africans and non-immigrants, and between large cities and small towns, are the most directly comparable. For this reason, the differences in terms of declared satisfaction are easier to interpret in terms of potential ethnic-based geographical biases in favor of one specific location or the other. The calibration of geographical preferences on the sub-sample of private tenants partly takes into account the role of residential status on geographical and labor market mobility. We come back in detail to this question in subsection 6.2. Finally, it may still be true that observed differences between the two groups do not only reflect geographic preferences, if they are partly determined by unobservable characteristics. However, we think that these issues of omitted variable and endogeneity are more likely to affect the level of satisfaction rather than satisfaction differences between ethnic groups. We notice two facts: first, Africans declare a higher level of satisfaction in large cities. Second, the variance of the distribution is higher among Africans, which may be interpreted as a higher level of unobserved heterogeneity in this population. The values that we get are robust to a number of variations, which are set out in Appendix D; they are also robust to the repli-cation of this method on a sub-sample of retirees. Finally, in Appendix E, we explain why the observation of residential mobility patterns at retirement may be relevant in order to identify geographical preferences, and we show that the results are qualitatively unchanged when using this information instead of the information on the declared level of satisfaction.
The bias of Africans in favor of large cities may have several causes, related both to the personal history of individuals and to the opportunities that are currently offered to them in the different locations. The non-immigrant French population is more likely to have had the opportunity to develop a specific relationship towards a rural region or a small town. On the contrary, immigrants are generally attracted to large cities, which act as fixation points during the migration process (Verdugo (2011) ). The importance of the location of newcomers is reinforced by hysteresis effects. The integration process of immigrants runs through the mobilization of family-based, friend-based or job-based networks, which often rely upon belonging to the same ethnic group. This feature has long been established throughout the world and is confirmed by the most recent work on the French case (Beauchemin, Hamel, and Simon (2010) ). The bond with a specific location, which partly stems from the size of the local population of immigrants, may be reinforced by the presence of ethnic-specific goods and services (for instance, food or religious infrastructure) as well as by a rarer feeling of rejection by the rest of the population, from next-door neighbors (Combes, Decreuse, Schmutz, and Trannoy (2010) ) to local civil servants in charge of immigrants. These hysteresis effects have consequences that our model does not take into account. Indeed, if geographical preferences are a function of the proportion of the population who belong to the same ethnic group, then the location choice has increasing social returns. Hence, when an African household decides to move into a small town, household members increase the value of this location for all Africans. These increasing social returns may be responsible for the existence of multiple equilibria, each equilibrium being characterized by a specific proportion of Africans in each location. The selection of these equilibria would then depend on the initial distribution of the population (since residential mobility is low in our framework) and on the self-fulfilling anticipations of the households (if all Africans think that the others will move into a small town, then it becomes an interesting option for them, which validates ex post the initial conjecture).
It may be argued that our method suffers from a selection bias. Households who live in a given location are not randomly drawn from the entire population. Thus, we overestimate the comfort parameter related to the alternative location. However, it is difficult to see why this bias would affect the distributions of d 1 − d 2 differently for Africans and for non-immigrants. Intuitively, the location choices of Africans are more constrained, and Africans are strongly overrepresented in location 2. We may then expect the empirical distribution of d 2 to be close to the unconditional distribution. Our method tends to overestimate the preferences of Africans for location 1, i.e. for small towns. The selection mechanisms are a priori more important for nonimmigrants, in both locations. As a result, the empirical distribution of d 1 is biased in favor of small towns, whereas the distribution of d 2 is biased in favor of big cities. We cannot conclude
Calibration of the utility levels
There are four possible alternatives: when an employed household considers a job in the other location, when an unemployed household considers a job in the other location, when an unemployed household considers the possibility of changing location without having a job in the other location, and the same for an employed household. For each pair (i, k), we have to compute four threshold values:
We use data from the ENL to compare mean incomes by location and employment status, for Africans and nonimmigrants. In order to be able to use the three waves of data, we adjust for inflation: all values are here given in 2006 euros. As before, these incomes are divided by the mean private-market rent per square meter observed in each location (L k ) to the power of 0, 2. Mean incomes and mean rents by square meter are displayed by Table 5 , which also gives, in the last two lines, the values of ln w i k and ln b i k , where w i k and b i k are divided by the mean private-market rent in each location, to the power of 0, 2. Table 5 gives three informations. First, African household incomes by consumption unit are much lower than non-immigrants' in both locations, regardless of the employment status of the respondent. Second, "efficient" wages, represented by w i k and b i k , are similar in both locations, regardless of the ethnic group or the employment status. Finally, the gains derived from finding a job are more important for Africans than for non-immigrants. Without changing location, this gain is between 33 and 40 % for the former against 27-28 % for the latter; when changing location, the gain is between 33 and 40 % for the former and between 22 and 33 % for the latter. Table 6 displays the probabilities
for each group. The space of possible states is represented in line and in column: either unemployed in location 1, employed in location 1, unemployed in location 2 or employed in location 2. Each cell represents the probability for an individual of the given group to prefer the column state to the line state. Formally, if y C designates the mean real income related to the column situation, and y L the mean real income related to the line situation, Table 6 gives the value of φ i ln y C /y L , e.g. the probability that an individual of group i chooses the column situation rather than the line situation. Table 6 : Probability of preferring the situation of the column to the situation of the line Table 6 shows the African bias in favor of large cities. For example, 47 % of Africans "prefer" to be unemployed in a large city rather than being employed in a small town. The nonimmigrant proportion is only 40 %. This is all the more impressive in that the gain from going from unemployed in location 2 to employed in location 1 is greater for Africans than for nonimmigrants (33 % against 22 %). Remember that it is about "desired location" here, i.e. without accounting for housing market imperfections, since the moving out process would happen under equal housing conditions. These imperfections are themselves likely to reinforce Africans' tendency to avoid small towns, as shown in the next subsection.
Probabilities of receiving a job or a housing offer
We use the different values described above to solve systems (3, 4, 5) and so compute the values of the different housing offer probabilities, as a function of α, as well as the job offer probabilities.
Figures 2 and 3 graph these probabilities. They distinguish different groups according to previous employment status. Figure 4 displays a synthetic comparison of these different probabilities, by ethnic group and initial employment status.
We first discuss the role of parameter α. For a given transition between two locations, a low value of this parameter means that it is difficult to get a job in the other location, so that the observed transitions are mostly due to a high housing offer probability. Conversely, a high value of α means that it is easy to find a job in the other location and so, that the housing market reduces labor market mobility through low probabilities of access to housing. This explains why the functions s 1 and s 2 are systematically decreasing in α. Moreover, for a given transition between unemployment and employment, a low value of α tends to lower the employment rates predicted by the model. This must be compensated for by a more difficult access to housing when no job has been found. This compensation is less needed, the greater the value of α, so that all the functions x 1 and x 2 are increasing in the six graphs.
The probabilities p e of staying employed between the two periods are 10 points lower for the Africans than for the non-immigrants. Our calibration points out the greater instability of the employment relationships of Africans. This instability may be linked to the employment contract itself, which may be more often term-limited than for non-immigrants. Africans may also be employed in sectors that tend to dismiss workers more often. Finally, the specific behavior of both employers and employees may also contribute to the explanation of this gap. Conversely, the probabilities p u of transition from unemployment to employment are not always lower for Africans. 5 Figure 4 compares the probabilities of receiving a housing offer between the two ethnic groups. We observe several interesting features. First, the probabilities are lower for Africans in seven cases out of eight. The largest gap is about the location-1 housing-offer probability for households who are initially unemployed and stay unemployed: the African probability is 100 times lower than the non-immigrant probability. In general, among the population unemployed in t − 1, Africans suffer from much lower probabilities. This is also the case for the population employed in t − 1, but to a lesser extent. These gaps at the expense of Africans may have different reasons. First, Africans may be discriminated against on the housing market. Landlords may be tempted to refuse African applicants because of personal prejudice, other residents' prejudice (Combes, Decreuse, Schmutz, and Trannoy (2010) ), or for any motive related to statistical discrimination. Second, there may be large unobserved differences between the two groups in terms of wealth, or credit market access. These differences may affect the relative mobility of the two groups. Last, personal networks may matter, as already mentioned on the matter of geographical preferences. Social networks make it easier to access the housing market: these networks are probably weaker for Africans in general and in particular in small towns.
5 Two opposite effects may explain why the differences in the values of p u are small between the two groups. On the one hand, Africans may be discriminated against at the hiring stage; on the other hand, Table 5 suggests that African workers have a lower reservation wage. The two effects would compensate each other. Finally, transitions are observed over a relatively long period. This may mask unemployment spell differences that take place over shorter periods. Figure 4 points out one noteworthy exception: the housing offer probability in location 2 without having found a job simultaneously, for households who were employed in t − 1. This probability is between 5 and 10 times larger for Africans. One possible explanation derives from the geographical distribution of the French public housing market, which forms a larger fraction of the housing market in location 2. As described in Bouvard, Combes, Decreuse, Laouénan, Schmutz, and Trannoy (2009), Africans are overrepresented in French public housing (called the "Habitationsà Loyer Modéré", or HLM), are more likely to enter public housing when they live elsewhere and to move within public housing. This pattern is robust to the control of observable characteristics.
These different probabilities are compatible with a scenario based on labor market and housing market segregation on the metropolitan scale (Gobillon, Magnac, and Selod (2011) ). This scenario would be as follows: because of financial constraints and discrimination, Africans would be discriminated against in the private housing market and would resort to staying in public housing. At the same time, a fraction of the population of non-immigrants would tend to avoid public housing, which would reinforce residential segregation. The impact of segregation on the labor market would, in turn, be twofold: Africans would remain too far away from employment centers (this is the spatial mismatch hypothesis, already mentioned); and their place of residence itself would convey a negative signal on Africans' employability, through a redlining mechanism (Gobillon and Selod (2007) ).
This kind of story may certainly contribute towards explaining the specificity of the Africans' situation. However, it does not explain why Africans do not leave large cities more often, despite the difficulties they seem to experience there. In that respect, our approach proposes a Į framework that can be seen as a complement to the studies focusing on spatial mismatch at the metropolitan scale.
Impact of the structural parameters of the model
In this section, we use the calibration of our model to understand the residual differences in unemployment and location between ethnic groups. We proceed in two steps: first, we focus on the differences in unemployment and location during the period of observation of the data used in the calibration; then, we analyze the long-run unemployment rate and geographical distribution, which is defined as the one that would occur if the transitions that we compute took place forever.
Short run

Decomposition of the unemployment differential
We derive the unemployment rate U i in ethnic group i from the previous formulas. This allows us to disentangle the effects of parameters p, x and s, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, hysteresis effects related to initial location and employment status. Let θ i j be the fraction of population i initially located in location j and v i j be the unemployment rate among this initial population. Let N i the total size, steady over time, of population i. We can write the total unemployment rate in group i as follows:
By replacing the empirical transitions l iu jj /n iu j , l iu j−j /n iu j , l ie jj /n ie j and l ie j−j /n ie j by the expressions given in systems (3) and (4), we can compute counterfactual unemployment rates using the calibrated values of the different parameters.
We consider two different scenarios: in the first, we compute the counterfactual unemployment rate U A of Africans when a specific parameter is fixed at its non-immigrant value; in the second, we compute the counterfactual unemployment rate of Africans when all parameters are fixed at their non-immigrant value, except one. This amounts to computing a counterfactual non-immigrant unemployment rate when only this last parameter is fixed at its value for Africans. For this reason, this unemployment rate is denoted U N A . Table 7 shows that the differences in labor market access play a central role. This stems mostly from the lower probability that employed Africans keep their job from one period to the other. Such difference explain more than 70 % of the observed unemployment gap. Second, space affects the unemployment rate differential through three different sets of parameters: the initial geographical distribution of the population, geographical preferences, and housing market access. The combination of these parameters explains about 15 % of the residual unemployment gap. The limited magnitude of the impact of space is partly due to the fact that residential mobility between the two locations is observed over a relatively short period of time (four years). 6 A refined split of space would also help identify intermediate cases of residential mobility and would probably lead to reevaluating the impact of space.
This decomposition does not take into account the general equilibrium effects induced by parameter changes and associated labor supply modifications, which may alter the non-immigrant unemployment rate. However, these are second-order mechanisms: Africans form about 5 % of the total population. Even the 9-point reduction in their unemployment rate that would stem from a change in p e would only lead to a 0.5 % increase in total employment. Our partial equilibrium approximation is justified when studying small subgroups of the population.
Decomposition of the location-1 rate
Similarly, we seek to decompose the residual gap in the fraction of people who live in location 1 (rural areas and towns with less than 100,000 inhabitants), which we call the location-1 rate. We use the same methodology as before. Let Z i j be the current proportion of group i located in location j. We have: (4) and (5). Table 8 displays the results. Given the low level of residential mobility when it is measured at this large scale, it is not surprising that θ, the parameter of initial location, determines around 90 % of the current location-1 rate gap between Africans and non-immigrants. A more interesting result concerns the marginal impact of the other parameters: housing market accessibility determines more than three fourths of what is left of the gap, whereas the labor market parameters play no role whatsoever. However, this result partly stems from the fact that the labor market parameters have already impacted the initial location of the households. This feature is a limit of our static model. For this reason, we then perform another calibration exercise, where we look at the impact of the parameters in a long-run framework, which corresponds to the steady state of the system of calibrated transitions.
Long run
Strictly speaking, the model does not allow us to tackle long-run individual behavior. Indeed, the utility functions are not intertemporal and agents' pasts do not impact their current valuation of a future situation. That said, a repeated sequence of stable short-run transitions yields a longrun distribution of the population, which may be very different from the short-run distribution. We now study the properties of this distribution. 
Definition
At each date t − 1, the population of group i is defined by the vector S i = n iu 1 , n iu 2 , n ie 1 , n ie
2
. Let Π i be the transition matrix from t − 1 to t:
We replace each element of Π i by its expression as a function of the calibrated parameters and the free parameter α. This allows us to define the steady stateŜ i = n iu 1 ,n iu 2 ,n ie 1 ,n ie 2 such thatŜ i =Ŝ i Π i . This state does not depend on initial distribution and the results are therefore cleared of hysteresis effects. We obtain the following values: the unemployment rate is equal to 25.3 % for Africans and to 9.1 % for non-immigrants and the location-1 rate is equal to 29.4 % for Africans and to 66.5 % for non-immigrants. These rates are noticeably higher than the short-run rates.
Results
This computation is then replicated for a counterfactual population of Africans whose characteristics in terms of job market access, housing market access or geographical preferences are made identical to non-immigrants. Tables 9 and 10 summarize the results. Table 9 shows that "space", even in this crude, binary definition, can explain 10 % of the residual unemployment gap and most of this effect runs through differences in housing market access. However, the main driving force remains the labor market parameters, especially the differences between p Ae and p N Ae . As for the differences in geographic distribution, Table 10 shows that the housing market accounts for three fourths of the gap, whereas the last fourth is accounted for by differences in geographical preferences. 
Extensions
We study the robustness of the results to the use of a different geographical split, to the inclusion of the role of the residential status, and we examine the impact of the job search intensity parameter in the other location.
Paris region vs rest of France
The geographical split we use is justified by the set of facts displayed by Section 2, as well as by Africans' stated preference for location 2. We here consider an alternative split, which separates Paris region from the rest of France. Table 11 shows that this split also makes sense, to the extent that Africans are overrepresented in the Paris region, are less likely to move out of it and more likely to move into it than non-immigrants. Table 11 : Transition matrix between unemployment and employment and between Paris region and the rest of France Appendix F explains the calibration based on this new split. Here we only comment on some of the main findings. The normal distribution that best approximates the geographical preferences of both groups has a mean of 0.29 for non-immigrants and a mean of 0.61 for Africans. Africans seem to prefer living outside the Paris region, all else being equal, whereas they in general prefer living in a large city.
The probabilities of housing market access are noticeably different from the initial calibration. This is especially the case of parameters s 2 and x 2 , which is not that surprising given the specificity of the Paris region housing market, even compared to other urban areas with more than 100,000 inhabitants in France. In line with the reference calibration, the probabilities of keeping one's job in each location are lower for the Africans (about 10 percentage points lower). However, out of the Paris region, the labor market is more favorable to unemployed Africans than to unemployed non-immigrants. The counterfactual exercises reveal that the housing market now plays a somewhat anecdotal role on the unemployment gap; as for geographical preferences, they no longer play any role. Symmetrically, the labor market accounts for a very small fraction of the location gap and geographical preferences contribute negatively to the explanation of the gap. 7 The Paris/Province split confirms the main conclusions that can be drawn from the initial split. The specificity of the Paris region paves the way for future research: in particular, a ternary split of space would probably help better understand the differences in residential/geographical mobility and unemployment between the two groups.
The impact of residential status
Our calibrations point out the differences in geographical preferences between the two groups as well as the differences in housing market access. Both results suggest studying more deeply the functioning of the housing market, and more particularly residential status heterogeneity. Many studies have tried to understand how residential status impacts geographical mobility. Some of these studies focus on homeownership, others on public tenancy, two statuses associated with large mobility costs. Indeed, homeowners face high transaction costs; their overall mobility is reduced, which may alter the probability of re-employment, as argued by Oswald (1999) . As for public tenants, they benefit from below-market rents, which impedes their mobility. Since public housing is overrepresented in large cities, this partly explains why public tenants are reluctant to move to a small town. Moreover, living in public housing may convey a negative signal in terms of productivity, which may affect labor market performances.
Recent studies tend to question the relevance of these various arguments. Munch, Rosholm, and Svarer (2005) and Munch, Rosholm, and Svarer (2006) show that rent control and homeownership do indeed have a negative impact on residential mobility, but that, for different reasons, homeowners and rent-control beneficiaries are faster to find a local job when unemployed. Similarly, the econometric study of Brunet, Havet, and Lesueur (2010) , which models simultaneously and non-parametrically housing and labor market decisions, also concludes that French homeowners face shorter unemployment spells than tenants. Using a very different methodology, Bouayad-Agha-Hamouche, Ménard, and Sellem (2010), who calibrate a job search model with heterogeneous agents, show that the lower re-employment probability of homeowners is mostly due to a wealth effect for homeowners who have finished repaying their mortgage and are now facing a less binding financial constraint. As for HLM tenants, Dujardin and Goffette-Nagot (2009) show that living in HLM does not seem to impact the unemployment probability, once taken the endogeneity problem into account.
That said, the debate stays open, all the more so in that these studies do not focus on the specific impact of residential status on different subgroups of the population, such as, for instance, immigrants. Our model does not consider residential status. This means that residential status is implicitly taken into account in the computation of the different transition probabilities, as well as in the black box of geographical preferences. In particular, the inclusion of residential status, which varies a lot between the different demographic groups, is likely to reduce the role attributed to these preferences.
The problem with this argument is that residential status is itself endogenous, as reckoned by all the aforementioned studies. For this reason, it is difficult to consider a causal link from residential status to housing or labor market access. It would be possible to modify the theoretical framework in order to include residential status. However, our dataset does not contain enough observations on African immigrants to calibrate all the relevant transitions (for instance, there are very few observations for an African household whose respondent was unemployed in (t-1), while located in public housing in a small town: as a result, the observed transitions are not reliable). As a consequence, we choose an alternative strategy, which relies on the criteria that we use to construct the counterfactual group of weighted Africans, e.g. the group of Africans we consider throughout the analysis. We now distinguish three possibilities: homeownership, private tenancy, and public tenancy, and we include the (t-1) distribution of non-immigrants over this split in the set of criteria used to reweight the sample of Africans. 8 Thus this new group of weighted Africans follows the distribution of non-immigrants in initial residential status. However, the calibration of preferences, which was already based on a restricted sample of private tenants in the baseline case, stays unchanged. The unemployment rate of Africans is now equal to 16.7 %, whereas 28 % of Africans now live in location 1. The unemployment gap falls from 12 to 9 points and the location-1 rate gap goes down from 30 to 26 points. This means that taking the heterogeneity of residential status into account does contribute to reducing the differences between the two groups, but this contribution is limited, all the more so that this method, which amounts to controlling for an endogenous characteristics, certainly tends to overestimate the impact of residential status.
The new job and housing probabilities we find are set out in Table 25 in Appendix G; they are very close to the baseline probabilities, even if the labor market is now even harder to access for Africans. We then reproduce the counterfactual exercises presented in Section 5. The unemployment gap is analyzed in Table 26 , which confirms the previous results, namely that the labor market accounts for more than 70 % of the residual unemployment differential, whereas space as a whole accounts for about 15 % (around 10 % for the housing market). The differential geographical distribution is analyzed in Table 27 . Again, our previous results are confirmed since location differences are mostly explained by space as a whole, i.e. the combination of the housing market, the inertia of initial location, and geographical preferences.
Impact of job search intensity in the other location
Our model depends upon a parameter which has not been stressed until now: job search intensity in the location where the household does not reside. We now study how the residual unemployment and location differentials are affected by this parameter. We reconsider the counterfactual analysis based on our baseline calibration, where we used α = 0.5; we now let α vary between 0 and 1.
The short-run rates linearly depend on α. We obtain
Unsurprisingly, the unemployment rate of both groups decreases with job search intensity. However, the impact of α is limited: at most, it decreases unemployment by 1.9 points for Africans and 1.3 points for non-immigrants. The reason for such a weak impact is that getting a job in the other location does not only depend on α, but also on the job offer probability by search unit, on geographical preferences, and on housing market access when the job offer is accepted. The conclusions are similar regarding the location-1 rate, which weakly increases with α.
In the long run, the effect of α is no longer linear and we have to resort to simulations to solve the model. Figure 5 displays the long run unemployment rates of both groups as a function of α. This figure confirms the short-run results, since unemployment rates weakly depend on α. Conversely, Figure 6 displays the long-run location-1 rate of both groups and shows that whereas this rate weakly decreases with α for non-immigrants, it strongly increases with α for Africans. Quantitatively, this rate rises from 4 % to 40 % when α goes from 0 to 1. Finally, note that job search intensity in the location where the household does not live is the same for both locations and both groups. It could be argued that it is easier to locate a job in a large city, where information is more concentrated, than in small towns, where it is more diffuse. Similarly, job search intensity may differ between groups, even if guessing the sign of the difference would not be easy. On the one hand, the lower job offer probabilities that Africans face may discourage them from increasing their search effort; but on the other hand, since Africans gain more from getting a job in relative terms, they may look for one harder. We chose to neglect these two possible dimensions of heterogeneity in job search intensity, since we would not have been able to identify the different parameters in the data.
Conclusion
The method that we have developed in this study enables to conclude that about 15 % of the unexplained unemployment gap between African immigrants and non-immigrants in France may be accounted for by mechanisms related to the specificity of Africans' residential mobility between French regions. The magnitude of this result is significant enough to try and pursue this line of work in different directions. An obvious limit of this work comes from our not being able to distinguish between immigrants and children of immigrants, who are here included in our reference group. Do secondgeneration immigrants experience an intermediate situation in terms of residential mobility? One cannot but hope that information allowing to identify this group will become more and more widely available in datasets such as the ENL in the near future.
The binary split of France neglects some of the phenomena we want to take into account. We intend to reproduce this exercise on a ternary split, in order to isolate the specific role of Paris region. Another possible extension would be to question the relevance of our partial equilibrium framework, especially to model labor demand. Finally, in a third extension, we may introduce some dynamics into the system, by allowing the structural parameters to vary over time. This would, for instance, allow us to take into account important historical trends such as the relocation of industries -and low-qualified jobs in general-in small towns and rural areas, as well as the massive increase in public housing supply in the large cities over the past forty years. The ideal may then be to turn to a structural estimation of the model. Table 12 shows that among the households who moved out at least once in the past four years before the survey, Africans were 16 % less likely to move to a city of a different size 9 (column 1). This specificity is almost entirely due to the fact that they almost never move to a smaller urban area (column 2).
A Mobility differential: the regression approach
During the four years to another to a smaller to a larger before the survey, city size class urban area urban area households who have move to ...
(1) (2) 
B Memory bias
In the ENL, unemployment rates in t are systematically higher than unemployment rates in (t-1): 9 % against 4 % in 1996, 8 % against 5 % in 2002 and 7 % against 4 % in 2006. This difference does not reflect any observable macroeconomic trend over the decade. It is attributable to three problems. First, a construction problem, due to the fact that it is not exactly the same population that are observed for the two rates, in particular regarding the stage in their career; then, an attribution problem: all individuals who have self-selected out of the working population, which is more likely to happen to the unemployed. Finally, the use of declarative data raises the issue of their reliability, in particular when individuals are asked about a situation that is quite remote in time. This memory bias, which may also increase because of differences in the wording of the two questions about past and current situation, is significant enough to have been used as an indicator of the level of salience of unemployment (Akerlof and Yellen (1985) ). As shown in 
D Calibration of geographical preferences: robustness checks
In this appendix, we study different robustness checks to the method used to calibrate the distributions φ i . First, note that if we use another variable on the level of satisfaction, results are very little affected. This variable, introduced in 2002, is the direct grade given by the respondent to her current housing situation. The distributions φ i that we end up with are best proxied by normal distributions with parameters (-0.43;2.85) for Africans and (0.22;2.59) for non-immigrants.
Thus we may prefer to calibrate the distribution of d, not from a mere difference between the level of satisfaction and the log of efficient income, but as the residual of the regression of this level of satisfaction on the income variable. Formally, this amounts to assuming that the instant utility of the household is given by V = β i ln y m + d m . Estimations are weighted by the same weights as before and are conducted on the sample of private-market tenants. Table 14 The mean and the standard deviation of the residuals of these two regressions on the samples of households located in location 1 or 2, as well as the resulting parameters of the distributions φ i , are given in Finally, as individual utility is first and foremost an ordinal concept, we test the robustness of our findings in terms of the two groups' relative preferences by estimating an ordered-probit model, weighted with the same weights as before. The results, displayed in 
E Calibration of geographical preferences: alternative method
In theory, it should be possible to calibrate the geographical preference of the two ethnic groups by looking at the residential location of retirees. Indeed, this population is interesting in the fact that job-related considerations no longer come into play in their location process. As noted by Gobillon and Wolff (2011) , more than 30 % of retirees say that they have moved out after being retired; among them, more than 40 % move to another region. Assuming that this major residential shock, retirement, equally impacts African and non-immigrant retirees, we may even interpret retirement as a kind of natural experiment which would help reveal the underlying preferences of the two groups, at least in relative terms. As shown in Table 17 , Africans' relative preference for large cities may still be observed during the relocation process of households who have just reached retirement.
This method, which relies on households' behavior rather than on declarations, is interesting but we chose not to use it in our calibration, for several reasons. First, the housing market of the two locations are very different, which may impact households' real income. Second, there is a selection issue due to the fact that many immigrant households, at retirement, develop a specific residential strategy where they alternate between France and their country of origin (de Coulon and Wolff (2010) ). Finally, we think that the ENL does not have enough observations for the transitions to be measured fully accurately. 
G Accounting for initial residential status
In this appendix, we present the results obtained if we consider a counterfactual population of Africans whose characteristics also match the population of non-immigrants in terms of initial residential status, according to its distribution within the following three categories: homeowners, private tenants, and HLM tenants. The transitions that we use are given by Table 24 . After solving the different systems, we get the following values for the parameters, displayed in Table  25 for α = 0.5. The counterfactual exercises allow us to assess the magnitude of the contribution of the different parameters to the residual unemployment and location-1 differentials. These exercises are summarized in Tables26 to 29. Table 25 : Calibrated values of the parameters for α = 0.5. Comparison between the baseline calibration and the calibration with reweighting according to initial residential status 
H Without the population of homeowners
We consider a subgroup of our sample, composed by households who are not homeowners in t and who were not homeowners in (t-1) either. The goal of this appendix is to show that the conclusions drawn from the calibration on the total population reweighted by initial residential status are not much altered when we consider this population of tenants. The population of tenants have specific characteristics. Tenants face a higher unemployment rate (11.4% for non-immigrants and 23.1% for Africans, reweighted according to the same characteristics as in the baseline case) and are underrepresented in small towns (the location-1 rate is equal to 44.6% for non-immigrants and to 17.8% for weighted Africans). However, the specificity of Africans' residential mobility may still be observed in this population, as shown in Table  30 . Table 32 : Calibrated values of the parameters for α = 0.5. Comparison between the reweighting strategy and the restriction of the sample to the population of tenants
The results of the counterfactual analysis, displayed in Tables 33 to 36 , are very similar to what is observed for a calibration based on the total population, reweighted by initial residential status: for instance, the housing market accounts for 8.5% of the short-run unemployment gap, against 8.7% in Table 26 ; the labor market does not impact the short-run location-1 gap, as in Table 27 . The same can be said about the gaps in long-run rates. The long-run rates calibrated on the population of tenants are the following: U A = 27.3%, U N A = 14.5%, Z A 1 = 12.4% and Z N A 1 = 52.3%. We see that 9.4% of the long-run unemployment gap is accounted for by the housing market, against 8.5% in Table 28 . As for the long-run location 1 gap, 75.4% is explained by the housing market, against 65% in 
